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INTEGRA v. MERCK: EFFECTS ON THE COST
AND INNOVATION OF NEW DRUG
PRODUCTS
Alison Ladd*
INTRODUCTION
The rising cost of pharmaceutical drugs is a concern of most
consumers.1 Americans reportedly spent $125 billion on drugs in
1999.2 The cost to discover and develop a new drug is similarly
significant and is estimated at nearly $1.7 billion.3 Drugs are
distinct from most other products entering the marketplace in that
they must undergo extensive premarket approval by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) before reaching consumers.4 FDA
approval is a lengthy process and takes, on average, 8.2 years.5
Given that the cost of research and development cannot be
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.S., Cell & Structural Biology,
University of Illinois–Urbana, 1996. The author would like to thank Eric Kirsch
as well as the staff of the Journal of Law & Policy for their guidance and
encouragement. Special thanks to Eric Parucki for his continued support,
encouragement, and, most importantly, for his patience.
1
David Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at
22.
2
Id.
3
Ann M. Thayer, Blockbuster Model Breaking Down: Pharma Industry
Reaches New Sales Peak, Despite Rising Costs and Bigger Challenges for Drug
R&D, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, June 2004, at 23.
4
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2004).
5
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 33 (July 1998) [hereinafter CBO STUDY].
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recovered unless and until FDA approval is obtained, the research
and development costs for a new drug result in a negative cash
flow for pioneer drug companies.6 Consequently, only one out of
5,000 possible new drugs is approved for sale and use.7
The Patent Act provides pioneer, or innovative, drug
companies with the right to patent new drugs.8 Patents enable
pioneer drug companies to preclude others from making, using,
importing, offering for sale, or selling their drugs in the United
States.9 Further, patents provide pioneer drug companies with
exclusive access to the marketplace, allowing the recovery of drug
development costs.10 Problematically, however, the FDA approval
process overlaps with the patent terms of new drugs and effectively
shortens the period of market exclusivity enjoyed by these
products. Pioneer drug companies thus face a reduced period in
which to turn profits and recover research and development costs.11
As a result, drug companies seek to recover these costs from
consumers through higher product prices.12
When the patent rights related to a new drug expire, generic
drugs are permitted to enter and compete in the marketplace.13
Generic drugs can be sold at much cheaper prices than their brand
name counterparts, in part because their manufacturers can make
use of existing research in developing drug formulas rather than
originating this knowledge base. Through patent laws requiring
6

Id. at 14-15.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA
(PHRMA), PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 3 (2003), available at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/2004-03-31.937.pdf
[hereinafter PHRMA PROFILE 2003].
8
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
9
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the
patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States . . . .”).
10
CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 3.
11
Id. at 3-4
12
Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18,
18 (2003).
13
See CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 2.
7
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full disclosure of patented inventions, generic drug manufacturers
can obtain the patent submissions of brand name drugs and acquire
the information necessary to develop and manufacture generic
versions.14 Having benefited from lower development costs,
generic drugs may enter the market with lower prices than their
brand name rivals.15 Prior to 1984, however, generic drugs were
prevented from entering the marketplace immediately upon the
expiration of brand name drug patents and were required to
undergo premarket approval by the FDA prior to sale.16 Patent law
prohibited generic drug companies from engaging in premarket
approval activities, including the manufacture or use of brand
name drugs during their patent terms.17 Thus, premarket testing by
generic drug manufacturers was delayed until the brand name
patent had expired.18
In 1984, in recognition of the need to control drug prices,
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act.19 Commonly referred to as the “Hatch-Waxman
Act,” after its two congressional sponsors, the legislation was
intended to address the issue of rising drug prices by controlling
the practices of brand name manufacturers and enabling generic
14

35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975) states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.

Id.
15

Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1677 (2003).
16
See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (holding that performance of experiments to derive FDA required test
data, conducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the
experimenter’s business is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude
others from using his patented invention).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).

LADD MACROED FINAL 2-16-05.DOC

314

3/8/2005 12:56 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

manufacturers to participate more actively in the market.20 Section
202 of the Act, codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),21 facilitates
quicker market access for generic manufacturers.22 Section
271(e)(1) has become known as the “safe harbor” provision to
patent infringement, as it exempts from patent infringement all
activities related to the gathering of information required for
compliance with federal laws that regulate drugs and veterinary
biological products.23
Courts have struggled to define the scope of the safe harbor
provision.24 Recently, the Federal Circuit in Integra LifeSciences I,
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA25 narrowed the scope of section 271(e)(1) by
excluding from the safe harbor all activities related to the
preclinical development of new drugs.26 The court held that the
20

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I) (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647;
see also Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act: The Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 91 (2002).
21
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). This section states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological
product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic
manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.
Id.
22
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647.
23
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
24
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 7
U.S.P.Q.2d 1562 (D. Del. 1988) (stating that the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
“presents a question of law that has no clear answer”).
25
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
26
The term “preclinical development,” as used by the Integra court, refers
to the experiments that identified the best drug candidate “to subject to future
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safe harbor does not reach “any exploratory research that may
rationally form a predicate for future clinical tests.”27 This decision
suggests that safe harbor protection is limited to generic drug
manufacturers that seek FDA approval for products that compete
with existing brand name drugs.28 The restriction of the safe harbor
to generic drugs means that liability may be imposed on brand
name drug manufacturers for activities they perform during the
period preceding FDA approval. This disparity greatly affects the
research and development of brand name drugs, as they must
undergo a more rigorous FDA approval process than their generic
competitors. As a result, brand name drug companies must
confront costly burdens to pharmaceutical innovation.
This note will examine the implications of the Integra decision
for the discovery and development of new drugs. Part I discusses
the interpretation of the safe harbor exemption in cases preceding
the Integra decision. These decisions clarified the types of patents
that are covered under the safe harbor29 and announced a
“reasonably related use” test to guide the application of the
exemption.30 Part II discusses the narrowing of the safe harbor
exemption by the Federal Circuit in Integra. Part III examines the
impact of the Integra decision on new drug innovation, with an
emphasis on the difficulties posed by the patent licensing process.
This section also explores the ways in which Integra has affected
the landscape of patent infringement exemptions and patent term
restoration and, more generally, competition between innovative
and generic drug manufacturers. Finally, the note concludes that
Integra may lead to a reduction in innovative research and
development in the United States and suggests that it may be time
clinical testing under the FDA processes.” Id. at 865-67 (emphasis added).
27
Id. at 867.
28
Id. (“The § 271(e)(1) safe harbor covers those pre-expiration activities
‘reasonably related’ to acquiring FDA approval of a drug already on the
market.”).
29
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Abtox, Inc. v.
Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
30
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Elan Transdermal, Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
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to consider amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to broaden the scope
of the safe harbor and lengthen patent term extensions for
innovative drug manufacturers.
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 35 U.S.C. §
271(E)(1)
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s primary purpose is twofold: “to
make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a
generic approval procedure for pioneer drugs”31 and “to create a
new incentive for increased expenditures for research and
development of certain products which are subject to premarket
government approval.”32 Although the first of these goals is
restricted to the regulation of drug products, the second goal is
unclear in scope. The language of the safe harbor provision in
section 271(e)(1) is similarly unclear with regard to the provision’s
applicability to products other than drugs. In order to determine the
scope of the safe harbor, courts have turned to the plain language
and legislative history of the statute.33 Using these tools of
statutory interpretation, courts have determined both the types and
uses of patents covered by the safe harbor.
A. Summary of the Hatch-Waxman Act
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress explained that
Title I of the Act would make available lower-priced generic
versions of drugs by allowing for an abbreviated approval process
for generic drugs, while Title II, by creating an additional patent
term, would “act as a spur to develop innovative and, ultimately,
less costly treatment for diseases.”34 The two titles of the
legislation attempted to balance the interests of generic and
31

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647.
32
Id. at 15.
33
United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560 (1982); see Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
34
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2653.
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innovative drug manufacturers.35 The act proposed two sets of
changes: first, it implemented an abbreviated approval process for
generic drugs, and second, it established patent term extensions for
innovative drugs.36 The intended purpose of these changes was to
foster greater competition in the drug industry and provide access
to lower-cost generic drugs.37
The abbreviated approval process for generic drugs eliminated
the duplicative testing previously required for FDA approval of
generic drugs.38 This abbreviated process is intended to extend
approval to generic drugs, provided that the generic version is the
same as the original drug or is so similar that the FDA can
conclude that additional safety and effectiveness testing is
unnecessary.39 In filing for FDA approval, the generic applicant is
required to make a certification to the FDA regarding each patent
that claims the brand name drug or method for its use.40 The four
possible certifications are: I) the patent information has not been
filed; II) the patent has expired; III) the date on which the patent
will expire; and IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the applicant’s generic drug.41 Under the first or second options,
the time of generic approval is not limited, as there is not a current
valid patent covering the generic drug for which approval is
sought. In contrast, under the third option, approval of the generic
drug occurs only upon the expiration of the existing patent on the
brand name drug. When making a certification under the fourth
option, known as a Paragraph IV certification, the applicant is
required to give notice to each owner of every patent covering a
brand name drug that the generic manufacturer asserts to be invalid
35

CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 3.
Id.
37
Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance between the Interests of
Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 51, 51-52
(2003).
38
CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 3.
39
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
40
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003).
41
Id.
36
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or not infringed.42 This notification requirement is designed to
protect holders of valid drug patents by allowing the patent holder
to sue the generic applicant for infringement.43 If an infringement
action is timely brought within forty-five days after notice of
Paragraph IV certification, the generic approval process is stayed
for a thirty-month period.44 Yet, upon a successful Paragraph IV
certification, the generic applicant receives 180 days of market
exclusivity.45
To balance the interests of generic and innovative drug
manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act also provides for patent
term restoration for certain products that are subject to premarket
government approval.46 A patent term extension, or restoration, is
intended to provide innovative manufacturers with an opportunity
to make up the portion of the patent term that is lost during the
regulatory approval of the patented drug.47 There are several
notable limitations on the extensions afforded by the patent term
restoration provision. First, extensions cannot exceed five years.48
Additionally, extensions are capped at fourteen years from a
product’s initial approval by the FDA.49 Moreover, a patent term
extension can only be applied to the earliest patent claiming a
particular product.50
In providing innovative drug manufacturers with the benefit of
patent term restoration, Congress also sought to prevent the de
facto extension of an innovative drug’s patent term through delay
42

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2003); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 24 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2657.
43
Id.
44
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003).
45
Id. § 355(j)(5)(A)(iv) (2003).
46
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2648. The products which can gain the benefit of patent term restoration
include human drugs, animal drugs, medical devices, and food and color
additives. Id.
47
Sarah M. Yoho, Reformation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, an Unnecessary
Resolution, 27 NOVA L. REV. 527, 536 (2003).
48
35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2002).
49
Id. § 156(c)(3) (2002).
50
Id. § 156(c)(4) (2002).
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in the approval of generic drugs following the patent term’s
expiration.51 This de facto extension of the innovative drug’s
patent term was created because a generic manufacturer could not
begin the testing necessary for FDA approval of the generic drug
product prior to the expiration of the innovative drug’s patent,
given that such testing was considered an infringing use.52 Thus,
the patent holder retained exclusivity on the market after the
expiration of the drug patent while the generic manufacturer was
testing its generic drug for FDA approval. Section 202 of the Act,
later codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), eliminates de facto
extensions by providing that “it shall not be an act of infringement
to make, use, or sell a patented invention solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a
federal law which regulates the approval of drugs.”53 This
provision is known as the safe harbor for patent infringement.
B. Types of Patented Inventions Covered by the Safe Harbor
In order to determine which patented inventions receive
protection under the safe harbor provision, one must consider the
Hatch-Waxman Act in its entirety. The phrase “patented
invention,” as used in section 271(e)(1), is in no way limited to
drug-related inventions.54 The safe harbor exemption should
51

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2679.
It is the Committee’s view that experimental activity does not have any
adverse economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the
life of a patent, but prevention of such activity would extend the patent
owner’s commercial exclusivity beyond the patent expiration date.
Id.
52
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
53
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2678.
54
35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 556 (1990). The only types of patented inventions to which the statute does
not apply are those pertaining to a new animal drug or veterinary biological
product “which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA,
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site
specific genetic manipulation techniques.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
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therefore be applied to any patented invention that would be
infringed in the course of conducting activities related to the
development and submission of information required by a federal
law that regulates drugs and veterinary biological products.55
Section 271(e)(1) makes no specific reference to other items
covered by the FDCA, such as medical devices, food additives, or
color additives.56 By contrast, the patent term extension applies to
drugs, medical devices, food additives, and color additives.57 Yet,
the definitions set forth in the FDCA for medical devices, food
additives, and color additives are defined separately and distinctly
from the definitions of drugs.58 Section 271(e)(1), therefore, does
55

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
57
Id. § 156(f) (2004).
58
21 U.S.C. § 321 (2004).
The term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or
related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is —
56

(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3)
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended
purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its primary intended purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
The term ‘food additive’ means any substance the intended use of
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or
indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the
characteristics of any food (including any substance intended for use in
producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating,
packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of
radiation intended for any such use), if such substance is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown
through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in
food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or
experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the
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not appear to cover medical devices, food additives, or color
additives. Thus, the safe harbor exemption applies to only some of
the products that receive the benefit of patent term restoration.59
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether Medtronic’s testing and marketing of an
implantable cardiac defibrillator, a medical device used in the
treatment of heart patients, was exempt from patent infringement

conditions of its intended use; except that such term does not include—
(1) a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw agricultural commodity
or processed food; or (2) a pesticide chemical; or (3) a color additive;
or (4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval
granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph pursuant to this Act,
the Poultry Products Inspection Act or the Meat Inspection Act of
March 4, 1907; (5) a new animal drug; or (6) an ingredient described in
paragraph (ff) in, or intended for use in, a dietary supplement.
21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
The term ‘color additive’ means a material which—
(A) is a dye, pigment, or other substance made by a process of
synthesis or similar artifice, or extracted, isolated, or otherwise derived,
with or without intermediate or final change of identity, from a
vegetable, animal, mineral, or other source, and (B) when added or
applied to a food, drug, or cosmetic, or to the human body or any part
thereof, is capable (alone or through reaction with other substance) of
imparting color thereto; except that such term does not include any
material which the Secretary, by regulation, determines is used (or
intended to be used) solely for a purpose or purposes other than
coloring.
21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(1).
The term ‘drug’ means (A) articles recognized in the official United
States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the
United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any
of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended
for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or
(C).
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
59
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 20-37 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2653-70.
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under section 271(e)(1).60 Focusing on what it perceived to be the
intended purpose of the exemption, the Court applied the safe
harbor to medical devices.61 The Supreme Court explained that, in
using the language “the development and submission of
information under a Federal law” to reference those preapproval
activities that would be exempt under the safe harbor, Congress
intended to refer to all activities related to “compliance with a
comprehensive scheme of regulation.”62 The Court emphasized
that if Congress had intended the safe harbor to apply exclusively
to drug patents, there were “infinitely more clear and simple ways
of expressing that intent.”63 The Court considered the patent term
restoration and patent infringement exemption provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act to be a single legislative package64 and
reasoned that Congress could not have intended for the benefits of
both provisions to apply to drugs, but only the patent term
extension to apply to medical devices.65

60

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). Eli Lilly brought
a patent infringement action to enjoin Medtronic’s testing and marketing of an
implantable cardiac defibrillator. Id. Medtronic’s defense was that its alleged
infringing activities were for the purpose of developing and submitting
information for premarket approval of a medical device and was therefore
exempt under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 666-67.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 670 n.3.
65
Id. at 672-73.
It seems most implausible to us that Congress, being demonstrably
aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory approval requirements
in this entire area—dual distorting effects that were roughly offsetting,
the disadvantage at the beginning of the term producing a more or less
corresponding advantage at the end of the term—should choose to
address both those distortions only for drug products; and for other
products . . . should enact provisions which not only leave in place an
anticompetitive restriction at the end of the monopoly term but
simultaneously expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only
failing to eliminate but positively aggravating distortion of the 17-year
patent protection
Id.
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The decision in Eli Lilly discusses medical devices generally.66
The FDCA, however, has established three classes of medical
devices: Class I, Class II, and Class III.67 Of these three classes,
only Class III is subject to rigorous premarket approval.68 Class I
66

See id. at 667-69.
21 U.S.C. § 360c (2004). Class I devices, or general control devices, are
those for which the controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the
safety and effectiveness of the device. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
Class II devices, or special controls devices, are those which cannot be
classified as a Class I device because the general controls by
themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the
safety and effectiveness of the device. A Class II device requires
sufficient information to establish special controls to provide such
assurance, including the promulgation of performance standards,
postmarket surveillance, patient registries, development and
dissemination of guidelines (including guidelines for the submission of
clinical data in premarket notification).
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
Class III devices require premarket approval. Class III devices are those
which cannot be classified as a Class I device because insufficient
information exists to determine that the application of general controls
are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device, and cannot be classified as a Class II device
because insufficient information exists to determine that the special
controls would provide reasonable assurance of its safety and
effectiveness. A Class III device that is purported or represented to be
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or
presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury, is subject
premarket approval to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and
effectiveness.
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
68
21 U.S.C. § 360e (2004). Class III devices require an approved
application for premarket approval. Id. § 360e(a)(2). An application for
premarket approval consists of full reports of all information, published or
known or which should reasonably be known to the applicant, concerning
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such device is safe
and effective; a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and
of the principle or principles of operation, of such device; a full description of
the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture,
processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation of, such device; an
identifying reference to any performance standard which would be applicable to
67
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and Class II devices are subject to an abbreviated approval
process.69 The Federal Circuit clarified the safe harbor exemption
as it applies to medical devices in Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.70 In
that case, the court considered whether the safe harbor exemption
applied to a patented device used to sterilize medical instruments.71
The court determined that the safe harbor applies to Class II
medical devices, even though their abbreviated premarketing
approval process precludes them from being eligible for patent
term extensions.72
One court has argued for symmetry in the eligibility
requirements for patent term restoration and the safe harbor
exemption.73 In Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.,
the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that
only those patents whose terms were eligible for patent term

any aspect of such device if it were a class II device, and either adequate
information to show that such aspect of such device fully meets such
performance standard or adequate information to justify any deviation from such
standard; samples of such device and of components thereof, except where the
submission of such samples is impracticable or unduly burdensome, the
requirement may be met by the submission of complete information concerning
the location of one or more such devices readily available for examination and
testing; specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such device; and any
other information relevant to the subject matter of the application. Id. §
360e(c)(1).
69
21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352, 360f (2004). All classes of devices cannot be an
adulterated, misbranded, or banned device. Id. Manufacturers or importers of
Class I devices must give notice to the FDA, as well as maintaining records and
reports to assure that the device is not adulterated or misbranded or to otherwise
assure its safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360h, 360i (2004). Class II
devices require promulgation of performance standards and, postmarket
surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of guidelines
recommendations, and other appropriate actions 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(B),
360d (2004).
70
Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
71
Id.
72
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002); See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Can the Safe
Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Shelter Pioneer Drug Manufacturers?, 53
FOOD DRUG L.J. 643, 654 (1998).
73
Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D.
Wis. 1999).
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extensions would be immune from infringement under the safe
harbor.74 The court argued that “the patent term extension is the
quid pro quo for the protection from infringement actions and vice
versa.”75 Thus, under Infigen, research conducted to support FDA
approval is not immune from infringement liability for patents that
cannot benefit from patent term restoration. The decision in Infigen
ignores the Supreme Court precedent established in Eli Lilly.76 The
Supreme Court did not inextricably link the type of patents covered
by the safe harbor to those eligible for term extensions.77 To the
contrary, the Court recognized that there could be situations in
which a patent gains the benefit of a term extension without the
disadvantage of infringement exemption, and others in which the
disadvantage will be suffered without the benefit.78
C. Types of Uses Covered by the Safe Harbor
In addition to determining the types of patents protected by the
safe harbor of section 271(e)(1), courts were also charged with
interpreting which infringing uses of patented subject matter
merited the benefit of the safe harbor. In Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., the Northern District of
California became the first court to consider the types of uses
covered by the safe harbor exemption.79 The court focused on the
“solely for” language of section 271(e)(1).80 The section, by its
plain language, allows for an infringement exemption for the use
of a patented invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the
74

Id. at 980.
Id.
76
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 671-73.
79
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379
(N.D. Cal. 1987). Scripps Clinic brought an infringement action on their
patented protein, Factor VIII:C, that causes human blood to clot. Id. Genentech
argued that their uses of Factor VIII:C, though not solely for the purposes
related to FDA testing, had some reasonable relationship to such purposes and
therefore did not infringe under section 271(e)(1). Id.
80
Id. See supra note 21 for language of the statute.
75
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development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.”81 The court determined that in order for an
infringing use to be exempt, the use of the patent need only be
related to the generation of information that would meet the FDA’s
requirements for drug approval.82 However, if the use is also
related to other ventures, such as preparations for patent filings or
agreements in preparation for commercial manufacturing, the use
of the patent will no longer be exempt from infringement.83
This interpretation was soon criticized for limiting the safe
harbor to activities that are “solely related” rather than “reasonably
related” to FDA approval.84 Courts subsequently adopted a test for
infringing uses that seized on the “reasonably related” language
rather than the “solely for” language of section 271(e)(1).85
The test for a reasonably related use was set forth by the
Northern District of California in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc.86 Intermedics alleged that various activities in connection with
the development of Ventritex’s implantable defibrillator were acts
of infringement.87 These activities included the manufacture of the
81

35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (2003).
Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. 1379.
83
See id. at 1396.
84
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 7
U.S.P.Q.2d 1562, 1565 (D. Del. 1988). The issue before the court was “whether
any foreign activities can be ‘reasonably related’ to FDA drug approval.” Id.
The court looked to the legislative history of section 271(e)(1) and found that it
did not “provide guidance on what activities are ‘reasonably related’ to FDA
drug approval.” Id. The court then criticized the decision in Scripps v.
Genentech for “interpret[ing] the statute to only cover activities that were ‘solely
related’ to FDA approval and did not consider what acts are ‘reasonably related’
to it.” Id., citing Scripps v. Genentech, 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
85
Elan Transdermal, Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926,
1932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that the word “solely” in § 271(e)(1)
modifies “uses” not “reasonably related”); Intermedics v. Ventritex Co., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
86
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
87
Id. at 1282; see supra Part I.B for discussion of the safe harbor as it
applies to medical devices.
82
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defibrillator, its sale to hospitals, and the demonstration of the
device at trade shows.88 The court found that all of these activities
were reasonably related to the performance of clinical trials
necessary for FDA approval of the defibrillator.89 The court looked
to Congress’s acknowledgement that the types and quantities of
information required by the FDA for approval will not always be
clear.90 Thus, the court held that the “reasonably related” language
was intended to provide latitude to those who seek FDA approval
in making judgments about the nature and extent of otherwise
infringing activities.91 The court recognized that the exemption
should not be lost because activities either fail to generate
information that interests the FDA or generate more information
than is necessary.92
The reasonably related use test broadened the scope of section
271(e)(1). The test set out by the Intermedics court asks whether
the use in question could reasonably contribute to the generation of
information of the type that would likely be required for FDA
approval.93 This test, by not limiting the exemption to infringing
uses that actually result in information for submission to the FDA,
provides innovators with a more generous safe harbor with which
to protect themselves against infringement allegations. Further, this
test gives safe harbor to drug manufacturers that use a patented
invention to obtain information relevant to FDA approval, even if
the information gained from the infringing use is also used for
other purposes.94
88

Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1282.
Id. at 1282-88.
90
Id. at 1280.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
See Telectronics Pacing Sys. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that there is not a requirement in the statute [35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)] that disclosure of information to persons other than the FDA
would “repeal” the exemption to patent infringement); see also Abtox, Inc. v.
Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that the statutory
language [of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)] allows the would-be infringer “to use its
data for more than FDA approval”).
89
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Although this test disregards the word “solely” as it appears in
the statute, it is clear from the legislative history that information
obtained from infringing uses need not be submitted to the FDA in
order to qualify for the exemption.95 Until the decision in Integra,
the decisions discussing the exempted uses of a patented invention
under the safe harbor gave little or no significance to the word
“solely” in favor of a broad “reasonably related” test. Under this
interpretation, innovative drug developers were given more leeway
in their research activities, given that the fruits of their research
activities would retain the protection of the safe harbor, even if the
resulting information had possible uses other than FDA
submission.
II. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. V. MERCK KGAA
Before Integra, courts generally gave broad reach to the
activities and types of patents that could be covered under the safe
harbor.96 Specifically addressing the applicability of the safe
95

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2678 (“A party which develops such information, but decides not to
submit an application for approval, is protected as long as the development was
done to determine whether or not an application for approval would be
sought.”). The court in Intermedics elaborated on what they considered
Congress’ intent to actually have been. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775
F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The court states that the phrase
“reasonably related” “reflects Congress’ acknowledgement that it will not
always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their new product
exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will take to win
that agency’s approval.” Id. The court went on to state:
[W]e do not believe that Congress intended a party to lose the
exemption simply because it turns out, after the fact, that some of that
party’s otherwise infringing ‘uses’ either failed to generate information
in which the FDA was interested or generated more information that
turned out to be necessary to secure FDA approval.
Id.
96
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Abtox, Inc.
v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Telectronics Pacing Sys. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v.
AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.De. 2002); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361
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harbor to innovative drug development, the Southern District of
New York in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc.97 found that the use of a patented invention for research and
development of a new drug can be afforded the protection of the
safe harbor.98 The court looked to Congress’s stated desire to
encourage innovation and bring new drugs to the market in a
quicker fashion.99 Nearly two years later, the Federal Circuit in
Integra denied safe harbor to the research and development of new
drugs, effectively narrowing the protection afforded to innovative
drug manufacturers.100 The Integra decision brings the scope of the
exemption back in line with the initial interpretation by Scripps
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.101 As previously
discussed, the Scripps court focused on the “solely for” limitation
of the statute, rejecting a broad construction that would immunize
“any use of a patented invention so long as some aspect of that use
is reasonably related to FDA testing.”102 This “solely for” test was
later rejected by other district courts, which adopted the reasonably
related use test set forth by the Northern District of California in
Intermedics.103
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
97
Bristol-Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361.
98
Id. at *19-20.
99
Id. at *10.
100
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
101
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
102
Id. at 1396.
103
Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 1999 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204-5
(D. Del. 2002) (stating that activities only exceed the scope of the §271(e)(1)
exemption when they have no objectively reasonable application towards
obtaining FDA approval); Bristol-Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361, at *1213 (denying summary judgment on the basis that a reasonable jury could
conclude uses of the patented invention were reasonably related to the
submission of information to the FDA); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Uses . . . may be related
to FDA approval, and yet be conducted for purposes other than, or in addition
to, obtaining FDA approval.”).
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A. District Court Decisions Prior to Integra v. Merck

The decision in Integra is a clear break from the line of cases
dealing with the infringement exemption for preclinical drug
discovery.104 Integra was the first appellate court decision to
address the safe harbor since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Eli Lilly.105 In the thirteen years between Eli Lilly and Integra,
three district courts addressed the application of the safe harbor to
preclinical development of innovative products.106 Each of the
three courts concluded that the safe harbor applied to these
activities.107 Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases, Integra overrules each of these
district court decisions, even though there was no disagreement
among the district courts regarding the applicability of the safe
harbor to preclinical development.108
In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the District
Court of Massachusetts became the first court to apply the safe
104

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Nexell
Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.De. 2002); BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
105
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
106
Nexell Therapeutics, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 197; Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at *1; Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
107
Nexell Therapeutics, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 205; Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at *19-20; Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
108
35 U.S.C. § 145 (2002) (covering the right to a civil action to obtain a
patent); 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2002) (granting the remedy of a civil action to any
party to a patent interference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences on the interference); 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2002)
(deals with the adjustment of patent terms); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (1999)
(stating in pertinent part that “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a decision of
a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145, 146, or
154(b) of title 35”); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (1992) (stating in pertinent part that
“[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent
infringement”).
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harbor to an innovative drug product.109 In that case, Hoechst had
used Amgen’s patented protein product, erythropoietin (EPO), to
facilitate the development of GA-EPO, a competing but novel
product.110 The court held that the safe harbor exemption applied
to a variety of Hoechst’s activities, which it deemed relevant to the
FDA approval process.111 The court emphasized that the use of a
patented invention must be reasonably related to FDA approval,
but need not be for the exclusive purpose of FDA approval.112 The
court also clarified that to fall within the safe harbor of section
271(e)(1), the making, using, or selling of a patented invention
must be “in ways that objectively bear reasonable prospects of
yielding information that might be relevant in the FDA approval
process.”113
Three years later, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc. followed and expanded upon the decision in Amgen.114 There,
the court held that the use of patented intermediates by BristolMyers Squibb (BMS) in the development of new drugs was
exempt from infringement under the safe harbor.115 The court
found that it was objectively reasonable for BMS to believe that
there was a “decent prospect” that the use of the patented
intermediates would contribute, in a relatively direct manner, to the
generation of information upon which the FDA could base
approval of the newly discovered drug.116 The court reasoned that
even though each use of the patented intermediates by BMS in
109

Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
Id. at 106.
111
Id. at 113. Hoechst’s activities included a multitude of studies on GAEPO that the company argued were required for FDA approval, including purity
studies, consistency studies, characterization studies, and viral clearance tests.
These studies were done in comparison with Amgen’s EPO product. Id. at 10911.
112
Id. at 108.
113
Id.
114
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ.
8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001).
115
Id. at *19.
116
Id. at *19-20, quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
110
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early stage research might not have yielded information that could
be submitted to the FDA, the uses related to this preliminary
activity could facilitate the generation of information that later
would be submitted.117 Furthermore, the court determined that
eligibility for the safe harbor exemption should not be delayed
until after a candidate drug has been selected or designated as the
subject of an application for FDA approval.118 The court explained
that if selection or filing of a candidate drug were required, the
exemption would never apply because the underlying research and
development necessary for FDA approval could never be
undertaken.119
Finally, in Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp, the
District Court of Delaware considered the application of the safe
harbor to an innovative product.120 Nexell differs from the two
117

Id. at *25.
Id. at *23.
119
Id. at *23-24. In response to Rhone-Poulenc Rorer’s argument that the §
271(e)(1) exemption only applies after a particular drug candidate has been
selected or filed with the FDA, Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that the exemption
must apply to all activities reasonably related to an actual or possible FDA
application:
It would be nonsensical for the exemption to apply only in the
development process after a drug candidate was identified, or after a
drug candidate was actually filed with the FDA. If so, the exemption
would never be reached because the underlying preliminary research
and development work could not be undertaken.
Id. at *23. The court also looked to the report of the Special Master, who had
been appointed to the case, given the district court judge’s absence due to major
surgery. Id. at *2. The report found that the uses of the patented invention were
reasonably related to an FDA application:
(1) even where each such use does not directly result in an FDA
application being filed, so long as the use was made in order to
determine whether or not an application for approval would be sought;
and (2) even though each such use of the patented intermediates may
not directly yield information that could be submitted to the FDA, but
relates to a preliminary activity that may facilitate or be useful in
generating information that could be submitted to the FDA.
Id. at *24.
120
Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.De.
2002).
118
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previous cases in that it deals with a medical device rather than a
drug.121 Nexell argued that AmCell had used its patented
antibodies in the development of a magnetic cell-separating
device.122 The court found that AmCell’s diverse activities were
either exempt because they were carried out in relation with
ongoing FDA trials or were insulated from infringement liability
because they were conducted pursuant to the FDA approval
process.123 The Rhone-Poulenc, Hoechst, and Nexell cases signaled
a preference for a broad interpretation of the safe harbor
provision—a trend that has been largely reversed by the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Integra.
B. Integra v. Merck
On July 18, 1996, Integra filed a complaint against Merck for
patent infringement in the Southern District of California. Integra
owns five patents related to a short tri-peptide known as an RGD
peptide.124 These peptides are known to bind to αVβ3 receptors on
the surface of cells.125 A researcher at Scripps Research Institute
121

Id.
Id. at 198.
123
Id. at 207-8. Amcell’s activities included sending information to
physicians to recruit clinicians to participate in FDA studies; maintaining a
booth at the American Society of Hematology featuring a display of the device;
advertising in medical journals; soliciting clinicians through Amcell’s website;
and providing the device to FDA-approved clinical investigators. Id. at 199.
124
U.S. Patent No. 5,695,997 (issued Dec. 9, 1997); U.S. Patent No.
4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991); U.S Patent No. 4,879,237 (issued Nov. 7,
1989); U.S Patent No. 4,792,525 (issued Dec. 20. 1988); U.S Patent No.
4,789,734 (issued Dec. 6, 1988).
125
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 862 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). RGD peptides are a short tri-peptide segment of fibronectin (an
adhesive protein) having the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp (in single-letter
notation, RGD). Id. The RGD peptide sequence promotes beneficial cell
adhesion by interacting with αVβ3 receptors on cell surface proteins called
integrins. Id. The RGD sequence attaches to the αVβ3 receptors on the surfaces
of cells. Id. at 862-63. This bond adheres the cells to the substrate containing
RGD. Id. at 863. Inducing better cell adhesion and growth promotes wound
healing and biocompatibility of prosthetic devices. Id. In addition, blood vessels
grow new branches due to controlled interactions with integrins. Id.
122
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(Scripps) discovered that blocking these αVβ3 receptors could have
therapeutic uses in inhibiting tumor growth.126 Following this
discovery, Merck KGaA (Merck) entered into an agreement with
Scripps to fund “the necessary experiments to satisfy the biological
bases and regulatory (FDA) requirements for the implementation
of clinical trials” using a certain cyclic RGD peptide developed at
Scripps, or derivatives thereof.127 A derivative of this peptide was
later chosen for clinical development.128 In its case before the
Southern District of California, Integra asserted that the agreement
between Merck and Scripps was commercial in nature and that
research conducted pursuant to that agreement was an infringement
of its patents.129 After trial, a jury found Merck liable for the
infringement of four of Integra’s patents.130
Merck appealed to the Federal Circuit from the jury’s verdict
of infringement.131 The company asserted that the district court had
erroneously interpreted section 271(e)(1).132 In its review of the
lower court’s interpretation of the statute, the Federal Circuit
126

Id. at 863.
Id. Merck KGaA began funding research at Scripps in 1988 when Dr.
Cheresh, a researcher at Scripps, identified a monoclonal antibody that had
activity as an inhibitor of integrin activity. Id. The collaboration was enlarged in
1995 when Dr. Cheresh discovered that a Merck-provided peptide, having the
sequence c(RGDfV), inhibits new blood vessel growth by interaction with a
specific integrin. Id. In this collaboration, cyclic RGD peptides were synthesized
and studied. Id. It was found that some cyclic RGD peptides have antiangiogenic properties, of interest for the treatment of a host of diseases,
including cancer, macular degeneration, and rheumatoid arthritis. Id.
“Angiogenic” refers to the process of generating new blood vessels, a process
essential to tumor growth. Id. The purpose of the collaborative research was to
(1) assess the potential efficacy of the peptides as therapeutic agents; (2)
discover the mechanism of the action of the peptides; and (3) shed light on the
histopathology, toxicology, circulation, diffusion, and half-life of the peptides in
the blood stream. Id. The ultimate goal of the research was to find a product that
would be sufficiently effective in the treatment of angiogenic disease that could
be developed and brought to market. Id. at 873-74.
128
Id. at 863.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 864.
132
Id.
127
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announced that the term “solely” limits the safe harbor exemption
from extending beyond uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to those specified in section 271(e)(1).133 The
court further explained that the limitation created by the term
“solely” was essential because “activities that do not directly
produce information for the FDA are already straining the
relationship to the central purpose of the safe harbor.”134 The safe
harbor’s central purpose was explained as an express objective to
facilitate the immediate entry of generic drugs into the
marketplace.135 The court thus held that “[t]he safe harbor does not
reach any exploratory research that may rationally form a predicate
for future FDA clinical tests.”136
Two rationales support the court’s holding. First, the court
noted that the FDA has no interest in the general “hunt” for new
drugs.137 Rather, it is concerned with specific drugs for which
approval is being sought.138 Second, the court held that Congress
had narrowly tailored the safe harbor in order to ensure only a de
minimis impact on patent holders’ rights.139 This de minimis
impact was protected by limiting safe harbor protection to those
activities that are reasonably related to the FDA approval of a drug
already on the market.140 The court therefore concluded that
Merck’s activities, which were not related to a drug already on the
market, did not fall under the safe harbor.141
The court also argued that if the safe harbor exemption was
133

Id. at 866. Section 271(e)(1) allows exemption from infringement for
patented inventions “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates . . . drugs or
veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
134
Integra, 331 F.3d at 866.
135
Id. at 866-67.
136
Id. at 867.
137
Id. at 866. In using the word “hunt” the court elaborated upon its
meaning by saying that “the FDA does not require information about drugs other
than the compound featured in an Investigational New Drug application.” Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 867.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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expanded to include Merck’s activities, it would “effectively
vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool
patents.”142 The court explained that many patents cover tools that
are used to facilitate general research to identify candidate drugs
and to test the safety of those newly identified drugs.143 The court
acknowledged that such tools fall within the safe harbor when used
for clinical testing required for FDA approval, yet argued that they
would hold little commercial benefit to the patent holder if they
fell within the safe harbor when used to support general
research.144 The court then held that if section 271(e)(1) was
“exaggerated,” it “would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent
Act for some categories of biotechnological inventions.”145
III. THE PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS OF THE INTEGRA DECISION
The decision in Integra poses new challenges for the
innovative drug industry. Problematically, Integra has created a
greater need for innovators to license patents for research and
development. With little or no protection from the safe harbor,
innovators will face great liability from the owners of research tool
patents, which are essential to innovative research. This is
especially likely, given that the common-law research exemption
has recently been narrowed and that no statutory experimental use
exemption exists in the United States. The patent term restorations
provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act have proved similarly
unavailing in aiding the recovery of research and development
costs by innovative drug manufacturers, as they fail to cover the
entire period lost to the regulatory approval process. Finally, the
cumulative effect of these problems could stifle competition or,
alternatively, drive innovators to perform their research abroad,
where patent laws are more amenable to innovative research.

142

Id. (explaining that patented tools facilitate general research in
identifying and testing the safety of new drugs).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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A. Integra Creates Problems for Patent Licensing
Integra has established that the safe harbor does not reach
down the chain of experimentation to embrace preclinical drug
discovery.146 Yet Integra fails to elaborate at what point research
moves from the preclinical research phase to a development stage
that is reasonably related to FDA approval and, thus, becomes
eligible for the infringement exemption. Specifically, the court
fails to enunciate which forms of experimentation reasonably
contribute to the production of information for FDA approval such
that the safe harbor would apply.147 Although the court did not
expressly limit the safe harbor exemption to generic drugs, it failed
to discuss the applicability of the safe harbor to innovators prior to
submission of a new drug candidate to the FDA.148 The decision in
Rhone-Poulenc indicated that the designation or filing of a
candidate drug is not a prerequisite to obtaining exemption under
the safe harbor.149 Yet the Integra court seems to suggest that this
might now be the case.150
The Integra court expressly acknowledged that the cumulative
effect of the number of patent licenses required to develop a drug
can be substantial.151 In addition to the high costs associated with
obtaining numerous licenses, manufacturers also might face the
resistance of patentees who refuse to license their technologies,
thereby blocking entire research programs.152 Moreover,
innovative drug companies will face the problematic concern of
predicting which patents they must license prior to embarking on a

146

Id.
Charles Raubicheck, Integra v. Merck: A Mixed Bag for Research Tool
Patents, 21 NATURE 1099, 1100 (Sept. 2003).
148
Integra, 331 F.3d at 867; see also Raubicheck supra note 147.
149
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, No. 95 Civ. 8833,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19362, at *23 (Nov. 27, 2001).
150
Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67.
151
Id. at 871.
152
See Nicholas Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra LifeSciences v.
Merck – Good for Research or Just Good for Research Tool Patent Owners?, 22
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 462, 470 (2003).
147
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new research project.153 The unresolved issue of what, if any,
activity by innovative researchers is covered by the safe harbor
leaves the innovative drug industry in a precarious situation. This
uncertainty requires innovators to make educated guesses
regarding which patents they must license in order to perform the
necessary research to develop new drugs. In seeking to protect the
rights of patent holders, Integra may have created a curious set of
circumstances: the use of a patented invention for drug discovery
will result in liability for patent infringement, whereas the use of
the same invention after designation of a candidate drug will be
immune.154 Researchers thus will be saddled with questions
regarding how licensing can be effectuated if, as research and
development activities progress, their activities unknowingly move
from being susceptible to infringement liability to being immune
under the safe harbor.
Further, innovation may be hindered by the numerous patents
that must be used in order to develop a new drug.155 A company’s
research potential hinges on the company’s ability to access
existing patents.156 Pharmaceutical development requires the use of
a large number of basic research tools and laboratory techniques.
The potential liability associated with and the cost of innovative
research is greatly increased by a rise in the number of patents
pertaining to research tools.157 Given that research tool patents
153

See id.
Paul Fehlner, Not Such a Safe Harbor After All, 10 No. 6 ANDREWS
INTEL. PROP. LIT. REP. 18 (July 22, 2003).
155
Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2001).
156
Kyla Dunn, A Look at . . . Patents & Biotech, WASH. POST, Oct. 1 2000,
at B3 (summarized statement of Robert Lanza, the vice president of medical and
scientific development of a small biotech company called Advanced Cell
Technology) (“[A] company’s research can be determined not only by what it
would most like to accomplish, but by which patents it is able to access.”).
Research tools have been defined by the National Institutes of Health’s Working
Group on Research Tools as “the full range of resources that scientists use in the
laboratory.” Mueller, supra note 153, at 11-12.
157
See Mueller, supra note 155, at 7-9; see also Donald R. Ware, Research
Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 270 (2002).
154

LADD MACROED FINAL 2-16-05.DOC

3/8/2005 12:56 PM

PATENT LAW AND NEW DRUG DISCOVERY

339

cover a vast range of products and processes necessary for
identifying and evaluating new drug products,158 manufacturers
must now secure multiple licenses to perform innovative research
on new drugs.159
However, researchers experience acute difficulties in accessing
patented research tools in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries.160 Researchers in these industries generally require
access to a greater number of proprietary research tools to conduct
their research than their counterparts in other fields.161 Research
tool patents, which now cover an increasing number of processes,
expose innovative drug companies to potential patent infringement
liability and may entitle patent holders to injunctive relief.162
Moreover, patentees are free to refuse licenses to their research
tools and are likely to refuse requests for licenses from both
competitors and small companies.163 Even when a patent holder is
amenable to licensing, license negotiation is time consuming and
the price demanded by the patent holder can sometimes prevent
successful negotiations.164 Licensing costs and risks may prove so
great as to impede, postpone, or even halt the development of new
158

Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the
Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH L.J. 347, 349-50 (2004). See also Mueller, supra
note 155, at 11.
159
Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 152, at 470.
160
See Mueller, supra note 155, at 11-12; see also Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S.Ct.
237 (2004) (No. 03-1237), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/
2004/2pet/6invit/2003-1237.pet.ami.inv.html (“If licensing were always a
realistic solution, however, Section 271(e)(1) would be altogether unnecessary,
because a researcher could always license any patented technology.”).
161
Id.
162
Ware, supra note 157, at 270.
163
Desmond Mascarenhas, Negotiating the Maze of Biotech “Tool
Patents”, 16 NATURE BIOTECH. 1371 (Dec. 1998). The author explains that
“large corporations often do not feel it is worth spending the time negotiating a
license with a small outfit whose product may never even succeed in getting to
the marketplace.” Id. He also indicates that patent holders tend to ignore
attempts by competitors to license their technologies. Id.
164
Id.; Mueller, supra note 155, at 16.
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drugs.165
Patent holders of biological research tools have attempted to
maximize the benefits of their patents by seeking licensing
royalties based on the sale of commercial products that are
discovered and brought to market using those tools.166 These
royalties are known as “reach-through royalties,”167 as they give
the research tool patent owner the right to royalties on subsequent
discoveries.168 Reach-through royalty licenses are common, given
that they are more profitable and easier to enforce than licenses
based solely on the sale or use of the research tool.169 As a matter
of public policy, however, patents should not be used to prohibit
research activities beyond what their patent specifications disclose
and claim.170 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
grant of a patent license is limited to the payment of royalties on
products within the scope of the patent.171 This restriction is
intended to prevent a patentee’s extending the monopoly of his
patent to derive a benefit not attributable to the patent’s
teachings.172
The Integra court argued that the expansion of the safe harbor
to include the preclinical development of new drugs “would
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning
biotechnology tool patents.”173 Yet the plain wording of the safe
165

Mueller, supra note 155, at 7.
Gerald J. Flattmann & Jonathon M. Kaplan, Licensing Research Tool
Patents, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 945 (Sept. 2002).
167
Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke Univ.: Shattering the Myth of
Universities’ Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 180
(2004).
168
Derzko, supra note 158, at 357; Cai, supra note 167.
169
See Derzko, supra note 158, at 357.
170
David Alban, Rambus v. Infineon: Patent Disclosures in StandardSetting Organizations, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 309, 318 (2004); see also 6-19
CHISUM ON PATENTS §19.04 (2004).
171
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
172
Id.
173
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
[P]atented tools often facilitate general research to identify candidate
drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiments on those new
166
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harbor provision of section 271(e)(1) appears to protect the use of
patented research tools in the development of a drug so long as the
use is reasonably related to submission of information to the FDA
for regulatory approval.174 The plain wording of the statute is very
broad and does not limit the type of patented inventions it
encompasses.175 There is no limitation in the statute that requires
the patented invention to be the same as the product undergoing
regulatory review,176 as would be the case with the testing of a
generic drug for FDA approval prior to the expiration of the brand
name drug’s patent. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in Eli Lilly
found that the phrase “patented invention,” as used in the statute,
includes all inventions, not simply drug-related inventions, let
alone generic drugs.177 Integra’s determination that the safe harbor
applies only to FDA approval of drugs already on the market and
not to the development of new drugs runs contrary to established
Supreme Court precedent178 and the plain wording of section
271(e)(1).
Complex and restrictive licensing of research tool patents
threatens to impede new drug discovery and development.179 Both
scientific progress and new drug innovation are at stake. Under the
present system, reach-through royalties reduce the profits of
innovative drug companies that seek to recover the costs of new
drugs. Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA approval falls
within the safe harbor, these patented tools would only supply some
commercial benefit to the inventor when applied to general research.
Thus, exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the whole
benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological
inventions.
Id.
174

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
Id.
176
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496
U.S. 661, 664-68 (1990).
177
Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665.
178
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). This apparent transgression from Supreme Court precedent was
noted in Integra by Judge Newman in her dissent. Id. at 877, citing Eli Lilly, 496
U.S. at 661 (“[T]he statute has been interpreted as of broader scope.”).
179
Flattmann, supra note 166, at 945-46.
175
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drug research and development.180 Although the Integra court did
not opine on the legitimacy of reach-through royalties, it did
acknowledge the cost to innovative drug companies of licensing
research tools patents.181 However, by interpreting the safe harbor
to exclude the use of research tool patents in the preclinical
development of new drugs, the Integra decision diminishes the
incentive for drug manufacturers to innovate.182 With frightening
consequences, the Integra decision overlooks Congress’s stated
intent of encouraging innovation and accelerating the introduction
of new drugs to the market.183
B. The Narrowing of Patent Infringement Research Exemptions
Critics argue that patents on drug discovery tools stifle research
and innovation.184 For example, research tool patent holders may
impede technological progress by limiting the use of their tools to
research that is most beneficial to them at the expense of new drug
research and development that is beneficial to society.185 This
argument is bolstered by the fact that a common law experimental
180

See Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants
and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources:
Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72090, 72091 (Dec. 23, 1999).
181
Integra, 331 F.3d at 871 (“[T]he number of patent licenses needed to
develop a drug may also affect the value placed on any single technology used
in the development process. The cumulative effect of such stacking royalties can
be substantial, particularly when reach-through royalties come into
play.”(citation omitted)).
182
See id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The right to conduct research
to achieve . . . knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of [a]
patent.”); Id. at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he patent system both
contemplates and facilitates research into patented subject matter, whether the
purpose is scientific understanding or evaluation or comparison or improvement.
Such activities are integral to the advance of technology.”).
183
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19361 at *9 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001).
184
Eric K. Steffe & Timothy J. Shea, Jr., Drug Discovery Tools and the
Clinical Research Exemption from Patent Infringement, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L.
REP. 369, 373 (2003).
185
See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L.REV. 81, 123 (2004).
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use exemption to patent law has been essentially eliminated.186
Judge Newman, in her dissent in Integra, explained that the
essential elimination of the common law research exemption is
“ill-suited to today’s research-founded, technology-based
economy.”187 Judge Newman noted that technological progress and
innovation would be hampered if even basic research were subject
to infringement liability.188 She argued that there is a recognized
distinction between “research” and “development.”189 Although
Judge Newman agreed with the Integra majority that the safe
harbor provision does not embrace the development and
identification of new drugs,190 she argued that the common law
research exemption should apply to these early research activities
and that the statutory immunity of section 271(e)(1) should be
triggered at the point at which the research exemption ends.191
186

See id. at 84. Although this note is not meant to be an analysis of the
current state of the common law research exemption, a brief history of the
doctrine is provided to give the reader some background. The common law
research exemption was first developed by Justice Story when he stated that “it
could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects.” Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
Justice Story further distinguished infringing activity from that of exempted
research by holding that infringing activity “must be the making with an intent
to use for profit,” whereas research is for “the mere purpose of philosophical
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification.” Sawin
v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). Since its development, the
common law experimental use defense has been very narrow and strictly
limited. Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The exemption
is limited to actions performed for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry.” Id. When activities have the slightest commercial
implication they do not fall under the common law experimental use exemption.
Id. Moreover, activities in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged
infringer also have been held to not qualify for the experimental use exemption.
Id.
187
Integra, 331 F.3d at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting).
188
See id. at 875-77.
189
Id. at 876.
190
Id. at 877.
191
See id. at 876.
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The extension of the now limited common-law research
exemption to embrace early research would promote innovation by
allowing drug companies more freedom to operate. Recently, the
House Judiciary Committee recommended a proposed bill to the
U.S. House of Representatives in an attempt to codify such a
research exemption.192 The proposed legislation provides that the
manufacture or use of a patented invention solely for research or
experimentation will not constitute an act of patent infringement
unless the patented invention has the primary purpose of research
or experimentation.193 The proposal was intended to “create an
incentive for the research and experimentation activities that fuel
this country’s inventive genius and our vibrant economy.”194 Thus
the proposed legislation was designed to promote innovation by
allowing research on a patented invention while retaining the
prohibition against research using a patented invention.195
Although the proposed legislation would not exempt research tools
from patent infringement, it is a step in the right direction.
Research exemptions similar to those proposed in Congress
exist in many foreign countries.196 In most of Europe,
experimentation on the subject of a patented invention is exempt
from infringement, while experimentation using a patented
invention to achieve other results falls outside the exemption.197
The enactment of a similar research exemption in the United States
192

136 Cong. Rec. H7498 (1990). This proposed legislation was entitled
Title IV, Research, Experimentation and Competitiveness, of the Patent
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990.
193
Id. at H7499.
194
Id.
195
Id. Research exemption legislation for research into the subject matter
of a patented invention is in accord with Judge Newman’s opinions set forth in
Integra. Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman
disagreed with the majority’s implication that Integra’s patents were research
tools. Id. at 878. She argued that the defendants merely investigated the subject
matter of Integra’s patents to develop improved RGD peptides, and therefore,
should be immune from infringement under the common law research
exemption. Id. at 875-78.
196
See generally David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life
Science Research, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 615, 648-56 (1994).
197
Id. at 656.
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would promote further innovation resulting from the investigation
of and improvement on patented subject matters, and,
simultaneously, protect the rights of research tool patent holders.
A research, or experimental use, exemption in U.S. patent law
could be analogized to the fair use doctrine of copyright law. The
fair use doctrine, statutorily enacted in the 1976 Copyright Act,
provides that certain socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works,
such as research, criticism, and news reporting, will not give rise to
liability for copyright infringement.198 The fair use doctrine has
been recognized as necessary to stimulate the production of new
copyrightable works.199 The doctrine has even been expanded to
encompass unlicensed commercial uses.200 Rather than
emphasizing the commercial nature of the use, the fair use doctrine
focuses on whether the use furthers the goals of copyright law to
promote science and the arts by developing new copyrightable
works.201 “Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh

198

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). Stating in pertinent part:
. . . [T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
199

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994)
(“[F]air use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright’s very purpose, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
200
Id. at 572, 594 (explaining that the commercial nature of the use of a
copyright does not render that use presumptively unfair).
201
Id. at 579.
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against a finding of fair use.”202 An expanded experimental use
doctrine in patent law would lessen or alleviate the restrictions on
research and development imposed by research tool patents and
would likewise promote the goal of innovation.203
Notably, the creation of too broad a research exemption for the
purpose of promoting innovation may result in the absence of
meaningful patent protection for drug discovery tools and a
corresponding increase in trade secrets.204 An increase in trade
secrets would both reduce public dissemination of research
information and inhibit innovation.205 Innovation will be most
spurred by facilitating the transfer of research tools. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) has released guidelines regarding the
dissemination of research tools developed with NIH funds.206 The
NIH has recognized that restrictions on the availability of research
tools can stifle new discoveries and limit future avenues of
research and product development to the immediate detriment of
science and the long-term detriment of product development and
public health.207 Thus, NIH discourages reach-through licensing on
the basis that such royalty obligations can only dampen incentives
for commercial development.208
An alternative solution, especially for research tools not
developed with NIH funding, is the creation of a compulsory
licensing program for tools not readily available for licensing on

202

Id.
See Mueller, supra note 155, at 43.
204
Steffe & Shea, supra note 184, at 374. A “trade secret” is information,
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
or process, that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy. 1-1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1 (2004).
205
Steffe & Shea, supra note 184, at 374.
206
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm.
207
Id.
208
Id.
203
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reasonable terms.209 Compulsory licensing might be effectuated in
two situations: 1) where a patent holder refuses to license with the
result of restraining trade or lessening competition, and 2) where
the patent holder refuses to license and also does not use the
patented invention.210 Thus, compulsory licensing would balance
the patent holder’s exclusive right against the public interest in
promoting commercialization of inventions and greater
competition in drug innovation.211 Furthermore, compulsory
licensing is consistent with the intellectual property obligations of
member countries of the World Trade Organization.212
Compulsory licensing would discourage research tool patent
holders from keeping their tools for in-house or personal research
only.213 Additionally, the enactment of legislation that requires
compulsory licensing for research tool patents would establish a
clear policy regarding licensing techniques and help to ensure that
innovative drug companies will not be burdened by excessive
licensing costs. Unfortunately, if a low-cost means of licensing
research tool patents is not developed, the effects of Integra and
the cost of stacking licenses on drug development will become
prohibitive, resulting in less innovation and fewer new drugs.
C. The Problem of Inefficient Patent Term Restoration
In order to promote innovative research and discovery, the
Hatch-Waxman Act provides for patent term extensions for
innovative drugs whose patent terms are encroached upon by the
209

See Mueller, supra note 155, at 58.
Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 389, 435
(2002).
211
Id.
212
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Art. 31(b), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf
(providing that compulsory licensing shall only be permitted if “the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful
within a reasonable period of time”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
213
Strandburg, supra note 185, at 139.
210
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FDA approval process.214 The patent term is essential for
innovative drug companies that seek to recover the costs of new
drug research and development once drugs reach the market.215 It
is also necessary for the recovery of costs related to the research
and development of drugs that either fail the approval process or
fail in the market.216 Similarly, by allowing pioneer drug
companies sufficient time to market their new drugs without
competition from generics, the patent term enables the
development of new products for the generics to copy and,
therefore, encourages competition from generic manufacturers.217
Unfortunately, drug patents do not provide the monopoly over
a market that one might expect.218 Because more than one drug can
have the same or similar effects, different drug companies may
have patents on competing drugs and share the consumer
market.219 A breakthrough drug usually exists between one and six
years on the market before a therapeutically similar drug is
patented and introduced.220 In addition, drugs are also forced to
compete with alternative, non-drug therapies.221
The Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to encourage innovation by
allowing for patent term extensions for innovative drug patents to
offset the portion of the patent term used during the FDA approval
214

Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
215
PHARMACEUTICAL AND RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA
(“PHRMA”), DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION:
THE NEED TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND PREDICTABLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 7 (Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/
policy//2002-06-24.436.pdf [hereinafter DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE]. The
average cost to develop a new prescription drug, including the costs of research
and development failures, is nearly $1.7 billion. Thayer, supra note 3, at 23.
216
Mandy Wilson, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic
Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on
Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 498-99 (2001); see also CBO STUDY, supra note 5,
at 3.
217
DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE, supra note 215, at 11.
218
CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 7.
219
Id. at 3.
220
Id. at xi.
221
Id.
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process.222 However, several limitations on patent term extensions
hinder the achievement of this goal. First, patent term extensions
cannot exceed five years.223 Second, the period between product
approval and patent term expiration may not exceed fourteen
years.224 Patent term restorations are also limited to a single patent
whenever the drug is covered by multiple patents.225 Due to these
restrictions, patent term extensions average about three years for
new drugs.226 This is only a fraction of the average time spent on
the approval process.227 Thus, the patent term extensions fail to
restore the actual time and cost lost by innovative drug companies.
The caps placed on patent term restoration have become
increasingly burdensome in light of lengthening FDA approval
periods.228 Due to additional preclinical screening of new drug
candidates and the larger clinical trials required by the FDA, FDA
approval times have increased.229 Given the delays associated with
the FDA approval process, policy makers should consider
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide for more meaningful
patent term extensions. In order to provide incentives for
innovation, patent term restoration should be extended to include
the entire clinical approval process.230 Patent term restoration
under the current rules assures that new drug products will receive
222

See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002).
Id. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2002).
224
Id. § 156(c)(3) (2002).
225
Id. § 156(c)(4) (2002).
226
CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 39.
227
Id. at 17 (noting that the total development time after clinical testing
begins before reaching FDA approval is, on average, 8.2 years).
228
Id.
229
Jill Wechsler, Pharmaceutical Pricing and Innovation Key Issues for
2003, PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 2003, at 28, available at
www.pharmtech.com/pharmtech/data/articlestandard/pharmtech/022003/42759/
article.pdf; see also Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for
Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One
Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS, 110, 122 (Supp. 2 1996).
230
In fact, the European Community has a more favorable incentive for
drug development. Patent time lost during the clinical development period in the
European Community is eligible for 100% restoration versus 50% in the United
States. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 229.
223
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below-average effective patent terms, making it more difficult for
drug manufacturers to recover the costs of research and
development and generate profits to fund further innovation.
Inefficient patent term restoration is not the only obstacle to
recouping the cost of developing new drugs. Even with the limited
patent term extensions, generic drugs have reduced the total returns
from marketing a new drug by approximately $27 million.231 The
percentage of generic drugs on the market has greatly increased as
a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act: from 13 percent in 1980 to 58
percent in 1994.232 Once generic drugs become available, brand
name drugs quickly lose more than 40 percent of their market.233
By limiting drug patent terms to fourteen years from FDA approval
and increasing the share of the market for generic drugs, the HatchWaxman Act has effectively diminished the incentive to innovate.
Integra, by precluding the application of the safe harbor to new
drug products,234 has further eroded the incentive to innovate by
increasing liability for and the cost of innovative research and
development.
D. The Stifling of Competition Between Innovative and Generic
Drugs Companies
In addition to creating higher costs for new drug research (and,
ultimately, higher costs for consumers), Integra might also lead to
abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One of the purposes of the
Hatch-Waxman Act is to allow generic drugs access to the market
immediately upon the expiration of the brand name drug’s
patent.235 Yet the Act also provides pioneer drug manufacturers
with a means of delaying the FDA approval of generic
alternatives.236 In order to obtain FDA approval, a generic drug
231

CBO STUDY, supra note 5, at 38.
Id. at 37.
233
Id.
234
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
235
See Miller, supra note 20.
236
Larissa Burford, In Re Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The HatchWaxman Act, Anticompetitive Actions, and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY
232
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company must file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) with the FDA.237 The ANDA must do two things: 1)
certify that the corresponding new drug patent has already expired,
when it is to expire, or that it is invalid or is not infringed;238 and 2)
notify the patent holder of the submission of the ANDA.239 Upon
notice, the patent holder has forty-five days to file a patent
infringement suit against the generic applicant.240 If an
infringement suit is filed within the forty-five day period, the
approval of the generic drug is automatically postponed for thirty
months.241 These stays are advantageous to pioneer drug
companies because they provide for more than two additional
years of patent exclusivity.
The exclusion of new drugs from the safe harbor may
TECH. L.J. 365, 368-69 (2004).
237
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2003).
238
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003) states:
[A]n abbreviated application for a new drug shall contain a
certification . . . that such patent has expired, of the date on which such
patent will expire, or that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted
Id.
239
Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (2003) states:
[A]n applicant who makes a certification [under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)] . . . shall include in the application a statement that
the applicant will give the notice required . . . to each owner of the
patent which is the subject of the certification or the representative of
such owner designated to receive such notice . . . .
Id.
240
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003) states:
[I]f the applicant made a certification [under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)] . . . the approval shall be made effective immediately
unless an action is brought for infringement of a patent which is the
subject of the certification before the expiration of forty-five days from
the date the notice . . . is received. If such an action is brought . . . the
approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the thirtymonth period.
Id.
241
Id.
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encourage pioneer drug companies to seek protection for their
products by filing patent infringement suits to trigger the thirtymonth stay on the generic drug’s approval. By this means, pioneer
drug companies can ensure longer market exclusivity to recover
research and development costs and make a profit.242 Abuse of the
Hatch-Waxman Act in this manner can be attributed to insufficient
patent term restoration and has become so prevalent as to prompt
investigations by the Federal Trade Commission.243 In light of this,
courts will be faced with frivolous lawsuits and consumers will be
denied quicker access to cheaper generic alternatives.
Innovative drug companies have employed a variety of tactics
to delay the sale of generic drugs. One such tactic involves the
negotiation of agreements between innovative and generic
companies whereby generic companies receive a large payout in
exchange for not releasing their products, thus enabling pioneer
companies to maintain their market share.244 With a similar goal in
mind, innovative companies have also begun to introduce their
own generics into the market prior to the expiration of their brandname drug patents.245 Although this strategy does not preclude
market access by other generics upon patent expiration, it has been
noted that drugstores usually buy the first low-cost alternative to
brand name drugs and rarely switch to other products once
customers grow accustomed to the offered generic product.246 Both
of these tactics risk possible antitrust violations, given that they
substantially reduce market competition.247 Increased liability
protection for new drugs at the research and development stage
will assist in reducing the cost of bringing new drugs to market and
will potentially decrease the incentive for pioneer drug companies
242

See Eurek, supra note 12, at 18.
Id.
244
Laura Giles, Promoting Generic Drug Availability: Reforming the
Hatch-Waxman Act to Prevent Unnecessary Delays to Consumers, 75 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 357, 370 (2001).
245
Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 229, at 114; Catherine Yang, The
Drugmakers vs. The Trustbusters: The FTC is Eyeing Big Companies’ Tactics
Against Makers of Generics, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 5, 1994, at 67.
246
Yang, supra note 245.
247
See Giles, supra note 244; see Yang, supra note 245.
243
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to employ anticompetitive tactics. Presently, such violations of
antitrust laws are likely attributable to the insufficient protection
afforded to innovative research.
E. The Possible Loss of Research and Development to Foreign
Countries
Without instituting some form of protection for innovative
research, whether by applying a research exemption to new drug
development or by implementing a low-cost research tool licensing
program, the United States runs the risk of losing its innovative
pharmaceutical industry to foreign markets. Many foreign
countries have broader research exemptions than does the United
States.248 For example, Japanese patent law provides for a general
statutory experimental use exception that permits the use of any
patented invention for experiment or research.249 Broad research
exemptions in foreign patent law enable innovative drug
companies to perform preclinical research abroad, beyond the
reach of liability from U.S. patents on research tools. Alternatively,
innovative drug companies might turn to countries with poor
patent systems. Thus, if preclinical pharmaceutical research is not
protected by a statutory safe harbor or by common law research
exemptions, innovative drug companies may be enticed to perform
their innovative research abroad.
The relocation of innovative research to foreign countries has
been facilitated by recent interpretations regarding the scope of
section 271(g) of the Patent Act. Section 271(g) states that anyone
who imports into the United States products made by a process that
is patented in the United States will be liable for patent
infringement.250 Two district court decisions have held that
248

Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 152, at 471.
Jennifer A. Johnson, The Experimental Use Exception in Japan: A
Model for U.S. Patent Law?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 499 (2003).
250
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003). It states:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to
sell, sells, or uses within the United States a products which is made by
a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if
the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during
249
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infringement by importation under section 271(g) applies only to
patented processes that produce physical, manufactured products
and not to those that merely generate information.251 Recently, the
Federal Circuit affirmed these holdings in Bayer AG v. Housey
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.252 The Federal Circuit decisively held that
infringement under section 271(g) “is limited to physical goods
that were manufactured and does not include information
generated by a patented process.”253 Thus, section 271(g) provides
extraterritorial protection for manufactured products and creates a
loophole for research tool patents whose use results only in
information on possible drug candidates.254 This interpretation of
section 271(g) allows innovative drug companies to perform the
research necessary to identify possible drug candidates abroad and
to make use of the research results in the United States once the
safe harbor applies.
The availability of broader research exemption patent laws
overseas, when viewed in tandem with judicial support for the
importation of information obtained using U.S. process patents
(including research tool patents), signals the potential loss of U.S.based innovative research in the future. Encouraging companies to
conduct new drug development abroad will create a flow of

the term of such process patent.
Id.
251

Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330
(D. Del. 2001) (“Upon a plain reading of the statute, the court finds that Section
271(g) addresses only products derived from patented manufacturing processes,
i.e., methods of actually making or creating a product as opposed to methods of
gathering information about, or identifying, a substance worthy of further
development.”) (emphasis in original); Synaptic Pharmaceutical Corp. v. MDS
Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that the importation
into the United States of reports on the results of diagnostic assays performed
abroad were not infringed under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)).
252
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
253
Id. at 1368
254
See Richard J. Warburg & Stephen B. Maebius, Warning – Research
Dollars at Risk!, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, available at http://www.foley.
com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/1300/2003-24-03.pdf.
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money, jobs, and new technology out of the United States.255
Currently, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry invests a greater
percentage of capital in research than do other American
industries.256 As a key driver of economic growth, the
pharmaceutical industry is a significant source of new, highlyskilled jobs.257 The industry is one of this country’s largest
employers, with approximately 223,000 employees nationwide.258
The loss of the pharmaceutical research and development industry
to foreign countries would therefore have a deleterious effect on
the U.S. economy. To prevent an exodus of innovative research, a
broader research exemption or a low-cost research tool licensing
program must be established.
CONCLUSION
Although Integra may have brought the safe harbor back in
line with Congress’s original intent of allowing generic
manufacturers swifter access to the marketplace, it has done so
with serious detriment to innovative drug discovery. Congress
clearly stated that one of the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act
was to make available more low-cost generic drugs available.259 It
is clear, however, that Congress also intended to create a new
incentive for increased expenditures for research and
development.260 The intended net effect of these two purposes is
thrown off balance by Integra.
Even before the decision in Integra, the incentive to innovate
could be viewed as having been diminished as a result of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The patent term extensions provided by the
Hatch-Waxman Act still resulted in pioneer drug companies
255

Brief Amicus Curiae of Wyeth in Support of Defendant-Appellant’s
Petition for Panel Rehearing and En Banc Rehearing, Integra LifeSciences I,
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1052, -1065) at 9.
256
PHRMA PROFILE 2003, supra note 7, at 11.
257
Id. at 17.
258
Id.
259
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647.
260
Id. at 15.
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realizing far shorter actual patent terms than innovators in other
industries.261 Shorter patent terms mean less time to recover the
cost of the development of new drugs. Recovering the cost of
development is especially important because drug development is
risky. Indeed, only one out of 5,000 potential new drugs developed
ever gains FDA approval262 and the cost of developing a single
drug can be more than half a billion dollars.263 The Hatch-Waxman
Act, by facilitating the rapid entrance of generics into the
marketplace, has, in turn, complicated the recovery of research and
development costs by pioneer drug companies.
The Integra decision ushered in an even bleaker environment
for innovation. By denying the safe harbor protection to the
preclinical development of new drugs, the decision exposes
innovative drug companies to enormous patent liability. This
liability results from the necessity of utilizing numerous patented
research tools to develop new drugs. Without establishing clear
guidelines regarding when innovative drug development may be
protected by the safe harbor, Integra provides pioneer drug
companies with little information as to when and for how long
research tools must be licensed. This uncertainty may result in the
necessity to license access to these tools on the basis of reachthrough royalties. Problematically, however, reach-through
royalties reduce a manufacturer’s recovery of already-high
research and development costs. To avoid the high cost of
accessing necessary research tools, innovative companies may
choose to perform innovative research abroad, given that the
importation of information resulting from overseas research
activities does not carry infringement liability.264 Or worse yet,
innovative companies may choose not to conduct research at all.
The importance of the Integra decision to the pharmaceutical
industry is evidenced by ongoing efforts to seek review of the
decision. Merck filed a petition for a panel rehearing or rehearing
en banc by the Federal Circuit. Several other domestic innovative
261
262
263
264

DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE, supra note 215, at 9.
PHRMA PROFILE 2003, supra note 7, at 3.
See Thayer, supra note 3, at 23.
See discussion supra Part III.E.
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pharmaceutical companies similarly urged review of the
decision.265 Furthermore, the legal and policy implications
compelled the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to
support the en banc review.266 On December 3, 2003, the Federal
Circuit denied en banc review.267 Merck filed a petition for writ of
certiorari on March 2, 2004.268 Two amicus briefs as well as the
briefs of the parties were subsequently filed with the Supreme
Court.269 On October 4, 2004, the Supreme Court invited the
Acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the
United States.270 The United States filed an amicus brief on
December 10, 2004 supporting review of the decision.271 On
January 7, 2005, the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted, as
was Eli Lilly’s motion for leave to file an amicus brief.272
Depending on the ultimate decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, it
265

Brief Amicus Curiae of Eli Lilly; Combined Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellant Merck KGaA,
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No.
02-1054, -1065); Brief Amicus Curiae of Wyeth in Support of DefendantAppellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and En Banc Rehearing, Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 021052, -1065).
266
Petition of Amicus Curiae the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York for Rehearing En Banc, Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331
F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1052, -1065).
267
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 02-1052, 02-1065,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26547 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
268
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 2, 2004) (No. 03-1237).
269
Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., No. 03-1237 (U.S. 1999),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-1237.htm.
270
Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., No. 03-1237, 125 S.Ct.
237 (Oct. 4, 2004).
271
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Merck KGaA v. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 237 (2004) (No. 03-1237), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/6invit/2003-1237.pet.ami.inv.html
(concluding that petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted because “the
court of appeals’ restrictive interpretation of Section 271(e)(1) will likely hinder
the development of important and medically valuable new drugs.”)
272
Merck KgaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 614, 73
U.S.L.W. 3396 (2005).
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may be time to consider possible legislation to determine the scope
of the safe harbor as it applies to innovative drug discovery,
particularly in light of the recent interpretation of 35 U.S.C. §
271(g) as excluding from infringement liability the importation of
information gained from the use of patented inventions.273 The
nation’s economy and health are in serious danger without
clarification of the patent laws as they apply to innovative drug
discovery.

273

See discussion supra Part III.E.

